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B
etween December 2007, when the U.S. housing 
and financial crises became the subject of daily 
news headlines, and July 2011, the civilian un-
employment rate nearly doubled, to 9.1 percent 
from  5.0  percent,  while  the  employment-to-population 
ratio  dropped  to  58.1  percent  from  62.7  percent—the 
lowest level seen in more than 25 years. 
Job losses of this magnitude cause enormous harm to 
workers, families, and communities.1 For instance, a classic 
study by economists Lou Jacobson, Robert LaLonde, and 
Daniel Sullivan found that workers involuntary displaced 
by plant downsizings in Pennsylvania during the severe 
recession  of  the  early  1980s  suffered  annual  earnings 
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losses averaging 25 percent, even six years following dis-
placement.2 Studying the same group of workers with the 
benefit of 15 more years of data, labor economists Daniel 
Sullivan and co-author Till Von Wachter3 show that the 
nonmonetary consequences of job losses are also severe; 
involuntarily job displacement approximately doubled the 
short-term mortality rates of those displaced and reduced 
their life expectancy on average by one to one and a half 
years. These studies suggest that the costs of the Great Re-
cession will be multifaceted and persistent.
Moreover,  the  key  challenges  facing  the  U.S.  labor 
market—almost all of which were evident prior to the 
Great  Recession—will  surely  endure. These  challenges 
































yare two-fold. The first is that for decades now, the U.S. 
labor  market  has  experienced  increased  demand  for 
skilled workers. During times like the 1950s and 1960s, 
a rising level of educational attainment kept up with this 
rising demand for skill. But since the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the rise in U.S. education levels has not kept up 
with the rising demand for skilled workers, and the slow-
down  in  educational  attainment  has  been  particularly 
severe for males. The result has been a sharp rise in the 
inequality of wages. 
A second, equally significant challenge is that the struc-
ture of job opportunities in the United States has sharply 
polarized over the past two decades, with expanding job 
opportunities in both high-skill, high-wage occupations 
and low-skill, low-wage occupations, coupled with con-
tracting opportunities in middle-wage, middle-skill white-
collar and blue-collar jobs. Concretely, employment and 
earnings are rising in both high-education professional, 
technical,  and  managerial  occupations  and,  since  the 
late 1980s, in low-education food service, personal care, 
and protective service occupations. Conversely, job op-
portunities are declining in both middle-skill, white-col-
lar clerical, administrative, and sales occupations and in 
middle-skill, blue-collar production, craft, and operative 
occupations. The decline in middle-skill jobs has been 
detrimental to the earnings and labor force participation 
rates of workers without a four-year college education, 
and differentially so for males, who are increasingly con-
centrated in low-paying service occupations. 
This article is a summary of an in-depth analysis of the 
state of the U.S. labor market over the past three decades, 
commissioned by the Hamilton Project at the Brookings 
Institution  and  the  Center  for American  Progress.4 This 
analysis revealed key forces shaping the trajectory of the 
polarization of the U.S. job market, including: the slowing 
rate of four-year college degree attainment among young 
adults, particularly males; shifts in the gender and racial 
composition of the workforce; changes in technology, in-
ternational trade, and the international offshoring of jobs, 
which  affect  job  opportunities  and  skill  demands;  and 
changes in U.S. labor market institutions affecting wage 
setting, including labor unions and minimum wage leg-
islation. The causes and consequences of these trends are 
discussed below and have important implications for the 
U.S. labor market, and income inequality more broadly, 
as the nation works towards economic recovery. 
Employment growth is “polarizing” into 
relatively high-skill, high-wage jobs and 
low-skill, low-wage jobs 
Long-term shifts in labor demand have led to a pro-
nounced ”polarization” of job opportunities across occu-
pations, with employment growth concentrated in rela-
tively  high-skill,  high-wage  and  in  low-skill,  low-wage 
jobs—at the expense of “middle-skill” jobs. This polariza-
tion is depicted in Figure 1, which plots the change in 
the share of U.S. employment in each of the last three 
decades for 326 detailed occupations encompassing all of 
U.S. employment.4 
Figure 1. Smoothed Changes in Employment by 
Occupational Skill Percentile, 1979–2007
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Source: Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1980, 1990, and 
2000, and U.S. Census American Community Survey 2008. 
These occupations are ranked on the x-axis by skill 
level from lowest to highest, where an occupation’s skill 
level (or, more accurately, its skill rank) is approximated by 
the average wage of workers in the occupation in 1980.5 
The y-axis of the figure corresponds to the change in em-
ployment at each occupational percentile as a share of 
total U.S. employment during the decade. Since the sum 
of shares must equal one in each decade, the change in 
these shares across decades must total zero. Consequent-
ly, the figure measures the growth in each occupation’s 
employment relative to the whole. 
This figure reveals a “twisting” of the distribution of 
employment  across  occupations  over  three  decades, 
which becomes more pronounced in each period. During 
the  1980s  (1979  to  1989),  employment  growth  by  oc-
cupation  was  almost  uniformly  rising  in  occupational 
skill; occupations below the median skill level declined 
as a share of employment, while occupations above the 
median  increased.  In  the  subsequent  decade,  this  uni-
formly rising pattern gave way to a distinct pattern of po-
larization. Relative employment growth was most rapid 
at high percentiles, but it was also modestly positive at 
low percentiles (10th percentile and down) and modestly 
negative at intermediate percentiles. 









































㄀㤀㤀㤀ⴀ㈀　　㜀Fast forward to the period 1999 to 2007. In this in-
terval, the growth of low-skill jobs comes to dominate 
the figure. Employment growth in this period was heavily 
concentrated among the lowest three deciles of occupa-
tions. In deciles four through nine, growth in employment 
shares was negative. In the highest decile of occupations, 
employment shares were flat. Thus, the disproportionate 
growth of low-education, low-wage occupations becomes 
evident in the 1990s and accelerates thereafter. 
Notably, this pattern of employment polarization has 
a counterpart in wage growth. This may be seen in Figure 
2, which plots changes in real hourly wages relative to 
the median by wage percentile for all U.S. workers over 
two time periods: 1974 to 1988 and 1988 to 2006.6 In the 
1974 through 1988 period, wage growth was consistently 
increasing in wage percentile; wages at percentiles above 
the median rose relative to the median while wages below 
the median fell. From 1988 forward, however, the pattern 
was U-shaped. Wages both above and below the median 
rose relative to the median. 
Figure 2. Percent Changes in Male and Female Hourly 



















































Source: May/ORG CPS data for earnings years 1973-2009. 
In short, wage gains in the middle of the distribution 
were smaller than wage gains at either the upper or lower 
reaches of the wage distribution. This simultaneous po-
larization of U.S. employment and wage growth suggests 
an  important  theme,  explored  in  detail  below—labor 
demand appears to be rising for both high-skill, high-wage 
jobs and for traditionally low-skill, low-wage jobs. 
The Great Recession has quantitatively but not quali-
tatively changed the direction of the U.S. labor market. 
The four major U.S. labor market developments ref-
erenced  above  and  documented  below—the  polariza-
tion of job growth across high- and low-skill occupations, 
rising wages for highly educated workers, falling wages for 
less-educated workers, and lagging labor market gains for 
males—all predate the Great Recession. But the available 
data suggest that the Great Recession has reinforced these 
trends rather than reversing or redirecting them. In par-
ticular, job and earnings losses during the recession have 
been greater for low-education males than low-education 
females, and these losses have been most concentrated 
in middle-skill jobs. Indeed, there was essentially no net 
change in total employment in both high-skill profession-
al, managerial and technical occupations and in low-skill 
service occupations between 2007 and 2009. Conversely, 
employment fell by eight percent in white-collar sales, 
office, and administrative jobs and by 16 percent in blue-
collar production, craft, repair, and operative jobs. 
Key contributors to job polarization are 
the automation of routine work and the 
international integration of labor markets 
Measuring  employment  polarization  is  easier  than 
determining its root causes, but researchers are making 
progress in understanding the operative forces behind the 
data. A leading explanation focuses on the consequences 
of ongoing automation and offshoring of middle-skilled 
“routine” tasks that were formerly performed primarily by 
workers with moderate education (a high school diploma 
but less than a four-year college degree). Routine tasks as 
described  by  economists  David Autor,  Frank  Levy,  and 
Richard  Murnane  are  job  activities  that  are  sufficiently 
well defined that they can be carried out successfully by 
either a computer executing a program or, alternatively, 
by a comparatively less-educated worker in a developing 
country who carries out the task with minimal discretion.8 
Routine tasks are characteristic of many middle-skilled 
cognitive and production activities, such as bookkeeping, 
clerical work, and repetitive production tasks. The core job 
tasks of these occupations in many cases follow precise, 
well-understood procedures. Consequently, as computer 
and communication technologies improve in quality and 
decline in price, these routine tasks are increasingly codi-
fied in computer software and performed by machines or, 
alternatively, sent electronically to foreign worksites to be 
performed by comparatively low-wage workers. 



















































This simultaneous polarization of U.S. 
employment and wage growth suggests 
an important theme—labor demand 
appears to be rising for both high-skill, 
high-wage jobs and for traditionally 
































yThis  process  raises  relative  demand  for  nonroutine 
tasks  in  which  workers  hold  a  comparative  advantage. 
As detailed below, these nonroutine tasks can be roughly 
subdivided into two major categories: abstract tasks and 
manual tasks. These tasks lie at opposite ends of the occu-
pational-skill distribution. 
Abstract tasks require problem solving, intuition, and 
persuasion. Workers who are most adept in these tasks 
typically  have  high  levels  of  education  and  analytical 
capability. Manual tasks, by contrast, require situational 
adaptability, visual and language recognition, and in-per-
son interactions. Examples of workers engaged in these 
tasks include janitors and cleaners, home health aides, 
construction  laborers,  security  personnel,  and  motor 
vehicle operators. Manual tasks demand workers who are 
physically adept and, in some cases, able to communicate 
fluently in spoken language. Yet they appear to require 
little in the way of formal education, at least relative to a 
setting where most workers have completed high school. 
In brief, the displacement of jobs—and, more broadly, 
occupations—that are intensive in routine tasks contrib-
utes  to  the  polarization  of  employment  into  relatively 
high-skill, high-wage and low-skill, low-wage jobs, with 
a concomitant decline in middle-skill jobs. 
Technology, trade, and offshoring are not by any means 
the only potential explanation for employment polariza-
tion—nor is it necessarily the case that any one explana-
tion accounts for the entirety of the phenomenon. Another 
frequently discussed explanation for the changing struc-
ture of employment and earnings in the U.S. focuses on 
shifts in labor market institutions, in particular, declining 
labor union penetration and a falling real minimum wage. 
There is little doubt that labor unions and the minimum 
wage contribute to changing employment and wage pat-
terns, but it appears unlikely their role is paramount. 
In the case of labor unions, their impact is largely con-
fined  to  manufacturing  and  public  sector  employment, 
neither of which comprises a sufficiently large share of 
the aggregate economy to explain the overall polarization 
phenomenon. Moreover, polarization of employment into 
high-skill, high-wage and low-skill, low-wage jobs occurs 
across all sectors of the U.S. economy and is not confined 
to union-intensive manufacturing industries. This makes it 
unlikely that de-unionization or the decline of manufac-
turing employment is primarily responsible for employ-
ment polarization. 
Nevertheless, the loss of middle-skill, blue-collar jobs 
in manufacturing—many at unionized firms paying rela-
tively high wages—has likely been particularly harmful to 
the employment and earnings of less-educated males. The 
job opportunities available to males displaced from manu-
facturing jobs, particularly those displaced at midcareer, 
are likely to be primarily found in lower-paying service 
occupations. While these job losses may be primarily at-
tributable to automation of routine production work and 
growing international competition in manufactured goods 
rather than to de-unionization per se, the magnitude of the 
income losses for males is surely magnified by the fact that 
the job losses are in union-intensive industries. 
An  often-discussed  explanation  for  changes  in  the 
structure of U.S. wages and employment is the federal 
minimum wage. The minimum wage can affect wage in-
equality by boosting (or failing to boost) wages in low-
paying jobs. But changes in the federal minimum wage 
over the last several decades appear an unlikely candi-
date for explaining the polarization of employment—that 
is, the growth of both low-and high-skill jobs—particu-
larly because the timing of this explanation does not fit 
the main polarization facts. The federal minimum wage 
declined sharply in real terms (after adjusting for infla-
tion) during the 1980s, which might in theory have led to 
a rise in low-skill, low-wage employment. Yet, as shown 
in Figure 1, the opposite occurred. From the late 1980s 
forward, the real federal minimum wage stabilized and 
then subsequently rose. We might therefore have expect-
ed low-skill employment to stagnate or decline. Instead, it 
grew rapidly.9 
The earnings of college-educated workers 
relative to high school-educated workers 
have risen steadily for almost three 
decades 
After three decades of sustained increases, the return 
to skills as typically measured by the earnings ratio of 
college graduates relative to high school graduates is at 
a historic high. In 1963, the hourly wage of the typical 
college graduate was approximately 1.5 times the hourly 
wage of the typical high school graduate. By 2009, this 
ratio  stood  at  1.95. The  entirety  of  this  45  percentage 
point rise occurred after 1980. In fact, the college-to-high- 
school earnings ratio declined by 10 percentage points in 
the 1970s. 
Moreover,  this  simple  comparison  of  the  wage  gap 
between college and high school graduates probably un-
derstates  significantly  the  real  growth  in  compensation 
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After three decades of sustained 
increases, the return to skills as 
typically measured by the earnings 
ratio of college graduates relative 
to high school graduates is at a 
historic high. for college graduates relative to high school graduates in 
recent decades. College graduates work more hours per 
week and more weeks per year than high school gradu-
ates, spend less time unemployed, and receive a dispro-
portionate  share  of  nonwage  fringe  benefits,  including 
sick and vacation pay, employer-paid health insurance, 
pension  contributions,  and  safe  and  pleasant  working 
conditions. And these gaps in nonwage benefits between 
high- and low-education workers have each grown over 
the past several decades.10 
One important proximate cause for the rising relative 
earnings of college graduates is the slowdown in the rate of 
entry of new college graduates into the U.S. labor market 
starting in the early 1980s. Although this slowdown is by 
no means the only cause of changes in U.S. employment 
and  earnings  patterns—and,  moreover,  a  cause  whose 
genesis  is  not  entirely  understood—it  is  nevertheless  a 
critical and often overlooked factor. 
Rising relative earnings of college 
graduates are due both to rising real 
earnings for college workers and falling 
real earnings for noncollege workers—
particularly noncollege males 
The high and rising wage premium that accompanies 
a college education conveys the positive economic news 
that educational investments offer a high wage return. But 
this trend also masks a discouraging truth: the rising rela-
tive earnings of college graduates are due not just to rising 
real earnings for college workers but also to falling real 
earnings for noncollege workers. Real hourly earnings of 
college-educated workers rose anywhere from 10 to 37 
percent between 1979 and 2007, with the greatest gains 
among workers with a postbaccalaureate degree. 
Simultaneously,  real  earnings  of  workers  with  high 
school or lower educational levels either stagnated or de-
clined significantly. These declines were especially steep 
among males: 12 percent for high school graduates and 
16 percent for high school dropouts. The picture is gen-
erally brighter for females, but there was essentially no 
real earnings growth among females without at least some 
college education over this three-decade interval. 
Though it is sometimes asserted that the “real” earnings 
declines of less-educated workers are overstated because 
they do not account for the rising value of employer-pro-
vided in-kind benefits such as healthcare, careful analysis 
of representative, wage, and fringe benefits data conduct-
ed by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics economist Brooks 
Pierce  refutes  this  notion.  Net  of  fringe  benefits,  real 
compensation for low-skilled workers fell in the 1980s. 
Further, accounting for fringe benefits, total compensa-
tion for high-skilled workers rose by more than did wages, 
both in absolute terms and relative to compensation for 
low-skilled workers.11 
































yGains in educational attainment have not 
generally kept pace with rising educational 
returns, particularly for males 
Given the steep rise in wages for college graduates rel-
ative to noncollege graduates over the past three decades, 
one might have anticipated a substantial rise in college 
attainment among young adults. Yet, the actual increase in 
four-year college attainment was fairly muted, particularly 
for males. Between 1970 and 2008, four-year college at-
tainment among white male young adults ages 25 through 
34 rose only modestly, from 20 percent in 1970 to 26 
percent in 2008.12 Remarkably, among white females of 
the same age range, college attainment nearly tripled, to 
34 percentage points from 12 percentage points. Thus, in 
three decades the white male-female gap in college at-
tainment went from positive eight to negative eight per-
centage points. 
Among  young African-American  adults,  this  picture 
is also mixed. The proportional gains in four-year college 
completion between 1970 and 2008 were substantially 
greater for blacks than for whites. Indeed, college com-
pletions rose more than two-fold among black males and 
more than three-fold among black females. Despite these 
gains, the levels of college completion for blacks remain 
substantially below that of whites. The black-white gap in 
college completion closed by only two percentage points 
among males in this period, and expanded by six percent-
age points among females. 
The only ethnic category for which gains in education-
al attainment have been truly spectacular was “other non-
whites,” a category that includes many Asian Americans.13 
In 2008, more than half of male and female young adults 
in this category had completed a four-year college degree. 
This is an increase since 1970 of 22 percentage points 
among males and 32 percentage points among females. 
Conclusion
Although  the  U.S.  labor  market  will  almost  surely 
rebound from the Great Recession, this article presents a 
somewhat disheartening picture of its longer-term evolu-
tion. Rising demand for highly educated workers, combined 
with lagging supply, is contributing to higher levels of earn-
ings inequality. Demand for middle-skill jobs is declining, 
and consequently, workers that do not obtain postsecond-
ary education face a contracting set of job opportunities. 
Perhaps most alarmingly, males as a group have adapted 
comparatively poorly to the changing labor market. Male 
educational attainment has slowed and male labor force 
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participation has declined. For males without a four-year 
college degree, wages have stagnated or fallen over three 
decades. And as these males have moved out of middle-
skill blue-collar jobs, they have generally moved down-
ward in the occupational skill and earnings distribution. 
The obvious question, as Scrooge asks the Ghost of 
Christmas Yet to Come is: “[A]nswer me one question. Are 
these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they 
shadows of things that May be, only?” Is the labor market 
history of the last three decades inevitably our destiny—or 
is it just that it could end up being our destiny if we do not 
implement forward-looking policy responses? 
While this article is intended as a spur to policy dis-
cussion rather than a source of policy recommendations, 
I will note a few policy responses that seem especially 
worthy of discussion. 
First, encouraging more young adults to obtain higher 
education would have multiple benefits. Many jobs are 
being created that demand college-educated workers, so 
this will boost incomes. Additionally, an increased supply 
of college graduates should eventually help to drive down 
the college wage premium and limit the rise in inequality. 
Second, the United States should foster improvements 
in K-12 education so that more people will be prepared 
to go on to higher education. Indeed, one potential expla-
nation for the lagging college attainment of males is that 
K-12 education is not adequately preparing enough men 
to see that as a realistic option. 
Third,  educators  and  policymakers  should  consider 
training programs to boost skill levels and earnings oppor-
tunities in historically low-skilled service jobs—and more 
broadly, to offer programs for supporting continual learn-
ing, retraining, and mobility for all workers. 
Finally, another potential policy response is to con-
sider R&D and infrastructure investments that will have 
broadly distributed benefits across the economy. Exam-
ples might include expanding job opportunities in energy, 
the environment, and health care. The return of the classic 
manufacturing job as a path to a middle-class life is un-
likely. But it may be that various service jobs grow into 
attractive job opportunities, with the appropriate comple-
mentary investments in training, technology, and physical 
capital. Perhaps these could be the shadows of what is yet 
to come.     
David Autor is a professor of economics at the Mas-
sachusetts  Institute  of Technology  and  faculty  research   
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Endnotes
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